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The paper deals with the imitation of fashion products, an issue that
attracts considerable interest in practice. Copying of fashion origi-
nals is a major concern of designers and, in particular, their ﬁnancial
backers. Fashion ﬁrms are having a hard time ﬁghting imitations, but
legal sanctions are not easily implemented in this industry. We study
an alternative strategy that has been used by designers. Instead of
ﬁghting the imitators in the courtroom, designers ﬁght them in the
market. The designer markets her products in separate markets, typi-
cally a ”high class” market in which the products are sold in exclusive
stores at high prices. Customers in this market seek exclusivity and
their utility diminishes when seeing an increasing number of copies
around. Their perception of the brand tend to dilute which poses a
serious threat to a fashion company. The second market is a ”middle
class” market in which there are many more buyers, and the fashion
ﬁrm competes directly with the imitators in this market. This mar-
ket can be used to practise price discrimination, to sell oﬀ left-over
inventories, and to get a spin-oﬀ from the design. The paper mod-
els the decision problems of the fashion ﬁrm and the imitators as a
two-period game in which ﬁrms make pricing decisions and decisions
on when to introduce their products in the markets. In addition, the
fashion ﬁrm decides how much eﬀorts to spend to increase its brand
image in the two markets.
1 Introduction
The paper deals with product imitation, an issue that attracts considerable
interest in practice. It occurs in many industries (e.g., furniture, toys, music,2 S. Jørgensen - A. Di Liddo
and fashion). Here we are concerned with fashion. A quick search of the
World Wide Web suggests that a broad range of fashion designs are copied
and imitations oﬀered for sale at low prices: jewelry, handbags, leather
belts and wallets, perfumes, watches, sunglasses, and mens’ and womens’
apparel1. This paper considers one particular designer product.
A speciﬁc feature of fashion goods is the fact that a consumer is willing
to pay a very high price for a product that she probably could buy much
cheaper elsewhere. What makes this possible is the ”brand integrity” or
”brand image” that lies behind the fashion ﬁrm and its products. The
natural enemy of brand integrity is ”brand dilution” which occurs if too
many people can be seen using the product, be it the original or a copy.
Brand dilution leads to decreasing demand for the original product, and
can be hard to reverse once the process is in motion.
The imitation of design originals is a major concern of designers and, in
particular, their ﬁnancial backers. Indeed, imitations of designer products
can be produced and marketed very shortly after (and even before) the
original appears on the market. Fashion ﬁrms wish to ﬁght imitations, but
legal actions are often infeasible. One reason is that in most countries,
fashion designs cannot be patented. Various counter-strategies have been
seen. Among these is the practice that a fashion ﬁrm buys up copy products
and destroys them, usually in a public event witnessed by the press. (This
has been done in the case of Cartier watches). Another strategy is that the
fashion ﬁrm oﬀers consumers who have bought a copy to have it replaced,
at no cost, by an original. This has been seen in the case of designer T-
shirts and caps of the brand Von Dutch. The strategy is useable for items
produced in smaller numbers (”limited editions”).
This paper studies the eﬀects of a diﬀerent strategy that has been
employed by designers. Instead of ﬁghting the imitators in the courtroom
or buying up copies, designers ﬁght imitators in the market. A typical
instance of this practice can be described as follows. The designer ﬁrm
markets its products in two separate markets. One market, A, is a ”high-
class” market in which the designer product is sold in exclusive stores at
high prices and limited numbers. Typically, stores are owned or franchised
by the fashion house. Customers in market A seek exclusivity, that is, their
utility is highest when they know that they are the only ones who possess
the product. Seeing an increasing number of ”similar” products around,
their perception of the brand tend to dilute.
Another factor that can decrease the strength of a fashion brand name is
the use of the name on other products than the fashion items themselves.
One often sees that fashion houses use their name on a wide range of
products (e.g., sunglasses, perfumes). In this case the fashion ﬁrm itself
1The fashion imitation industry seems to be particularly ﬂourishing in India and
Southeast Asia.Design Imitation in the Fashion Industry 3
may contribute to the dilution of the brand.
Knowing that it cannot prevent imitations, the fashion ﬁrm enters the
”middle-class” market, B. Thus, after having sold the product in market A
for a limited time, the ﬁrm ”moves the product” to market B. Typically this
is accomplished by introducing a cheaper ”diﬀusion line”. (One example
is the expensive Armani Via Borgo Nuevo line which diﬀuses into the less
expensive Armani and Emporio Armani lines). In market B there are many
more buyers and the products are sold at considerably lower prices than
in market A. The stores selling the fashion product can be licensees of the
fashion ﬁrm or manufacturer-owned ”factory outlets”.
The fashion ﬁrm can have several objectives for entering market B. One
is to ﬁght the imitations in the market, a second is to dispose of left-over
inventory, and a third is to beneﬁt from a spin-oﬀ from the original design.
This paper gives a stylized image of the marketing of original designs and
imitations in the fashion industry. We consider a fashion ﬁrm, henceforth
denoted by E, and conﬁne our interest to one speciﬁc product of ﬁrm E.
The ﬁrm spends considerable amounts of money in developing new designs
of the product. Although the manufacturing costs may not be that high,
the total costs of the ﬁrm typically include sizeable expenditures on its
creative staﬀ and on advertising.
In market B there is a competing ﬁrm (or a fringe of ﬁrms), henceforth
denoted by P, producing an imitation of E’s product. The aim of P is
to have a product which ”looks like” that of E, with the purpose of free-
riding on the brand image of the fashion ﬁrm. Firm P does not spend
anything on developing new designs of its own; the ﬁrm simply adjusts
the design of their product to imitate that of E. The costs of ﬁrm P are
substantially lower than those of ﬁrm E and the products of ﬁrm P sell at
considerably lower prices in non-exclusive stores. The imitating ﬁrm does
nothing to create a demand for its product. Demand for the imitation is
generated by consumers who wish to imitate the consumption of wealthy,
trend-setting consumers. Thus, consumption imitation creates a demand
for the imitator’s product.
Studies of fashion imitation problems using game theoretic methods are
very few. In fact, we only know about the one in Caulkins et al. (2003).
These authors are interested in explaining the occurrence of fashion cycles
and suggest an optimal control model in which state variables are the posi-
tions of the fashion ﬁrm and the imitator along a one-dimensional product
space. However, the imitator is not a decision maker. She always chases the
innovator and her position is determined by the position of the innovator
(which, in turn, is determined by the innovator’s design eﬀorts). Thus, our
work can be seen as a ﬁrst exploration of the (realistic) situation in which
a fashion ﬁrm faces imitators in the market place. An account of fashion
imitation in practice is found in the article in The Economicst, March 6th,4 S. Jørgensen - A. Di Liddo
2004.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops a two-period game
model, incorporating pricing decisions of both ﬁrms and image building
expenditures of the fashion ﬁrm E. The extension to a general number of
periods is straightforward, but does not add to our understanding of the
imitation problem, at least in the present setup. Section 3 contains the
analysis of the game and Section 4 concludes.
2 A Two-period Game Model
Firm E is the leading fashion ﬁrm and P is a ﬁrm that imitates the design of
the product of ﬁrm E2. The product of E is sold in markets A (”high-class”)
and B (”middle-class”), while P sells its imitations in market B only. Thus,
the two ﬁrms compete in market B, but not in market A. However, the
sales volume in market B may inﬂuence the image of the designer brand in
markets A (for details, see Section 2.3). For the particular product under
consideration, we assume that ﬁrm E is a monopolist in market A.
2.1 Timing of Decisions
Firm E introduces a new design in market A at each of the time instants
n = 0,1,2. One incentive for the continual introduction of new designs
is the fact that designs will be copied by imitating ﬁrms, but this is not
the main objective. Coming up continually with new designs is the raison
d’ˆ etre of fashion ﬁrms.
The game terminates at time n = 2. When a new design is introduced,
the existing design is withdrawn from markets A and B. A design having
been introduced in market A at time n ∈ {0,1} is removed from market A
and introduced on market B at time tn. Thus, at any instant of time there
is only one design of ﬁrm E in the market.
Time instants tn are decision variables of ﬁrm E and must satisfy the
constraints
n + κE ≤ tn ≤ n + 1, (1)
where κE ∈]0,1[ is a constant. The interpretation of the left-hand inequality
in (1) is the design original will be exclusive to the buyers on market A
from time n to time tn, and that ﬁrm E guarantees its buyers in market A
that the product will be sold exclusively in that market at least until time
n + κE. (Clearly, an imitation may appear in market B before time tn).
2The letters designating the ﬁrms are borrowed from pursuit-evasion games: ”E”
for evader, ”P” for pursuer. Firm P can also represent a fringe of homogeneous
ﬁrms.Design Imitation in the Fashion Industry 5
Note that we have assumed that a new design remain in market A at least
for a time κE, in both periods.
Firm P observes instantaneously a new design introduced by E and starts
to prepare the production and marketing of its imitation. Let τn denote
the time of the introduction of P’s product on market B in period n and
impose the constraint
n + κP ≤ τn ≤ n + 1,
where κP ∈ [0,1[ is a constant . Thus, the earliest time the imitation
can be introduced is at n + κP. If κP > 0, the interpretation is that the
imitator needs some time to prepare to market its product. If κP = 0, the
imitator has the option of introducing its product simultaneously with the
new design3. Note that we have assumed that the earliest time to introduce
the imitation is the same in both periods.
For the earliest introduction times κE and κP we assume κP < κE. This
means that the imitator could introduce its product before the time where
the design original can be moved from market A to B4.
2.2 Demand Functions
Let ”period n” be the time interval from time n to time n + 1. In what
follows, a superscript n indicates a period number. To specify the demand
functions in the three markets we need some notation. All demands deﬁned
below are deterministic and should be interpreted as ”demand rates per
unit of time”.
Demand Price Market Product Period
Qn
A pn
A A original monopoly
Qn
BE pn
BE B original duopoly
Qn
BMP pn
BMP B imitation monopoly
Qn
BP pn
BP B imitation duopoly
We assume that the price pn
A of the original in market A is ﬁxed, at




B represent the brand image of the design original, as
assessed by consumers in markets A and B, respectively. Our hypothesis
is that consumers in these markets have diﬀerent perceptions of the brand
3Copies could actually be on the market before the original is for sale. Magdo
(2000) writes that ”as more advanced technology makes it possible to see high-
quality copies appear in stores before the original has even hit the market”
(Magdo (2000, p. 1)). Note that such a situation is not possible in our framework.
4Otherwise, ﬁrm E could have a monopoly period in market B which seems less
plausible, in view of the speed at which imitations of new designs appear on the
market.6 S. Jørgensen - A. Di Liddo
and are inﬂuenced by the prices charged by the two ﬁrms. Demand rates




















in which η,αBE,θE,γ,αBMP,αBP,θP, and δ are positive constants.
The assumption in (2) is that demand in market A, in which ﬁrm E is
a monopolist, depends on the brand image only. Buyers in this market are
willing to pay, and pays, the high price ¯ p, but their demand diminishes
with their assessment of the brand image.
Equations (3) and (5) mean that the demand of both ﬁrms increase with
the brand image during the duopoly period in market B. The α’s being
diﬀerent means that buyers of the original and the imitation may react
diﬀerently to their perceptions of the brand image. The second term on
the right-hand side reﬂects the direct inﬂuence of a ﬁrm’s own price on its
demand. Here, a plausible assumption could be θE < θP, that is, those
customers who buy the fashion product are less sensitive to a change in
product price than those who buy the imitation. The third term reﬂects
that consumers also react on the ”price diﬀerential” pn
BE − pn
BP between
the two products. Thus, ceteris paribus, consumers buy the product with
the lowest price.
The speciﬁcation in (4) means that the demand in market B, during the
monopoly period of ﬁrm P, depends on the consumers’ assessment of the
brand and the price of the imitation.
Using the demand functions introduced above, we deﬁne the sales func-
tions
Sn
A = (tn − n)Qn
A (6)
Sn
BE = (n + 1 − tn)Qn
BE (7)
Sn
BP = (tn − τn)Qn
BMP + (n + 1 − tn)Qn
BP. (8)
Equation (6) says that sales of ﬁrm E in market A are the sales rate Qn
A
over the time interval from time n to time tn where the designer product is
removed from market A. Equation (7) means that sales of ﬁrm E in market
B are the sales rate Qn
BE over the remaining period from tn to n + 1. The
speciﬁcation in (8) says that the sales of ﬁrm P in market B are the sales
rate Qn
BMP during the monopoly period (from τn to tn), plus the sales rate
Qn




B can be seen as the combined set of beliefs (per-
ceptions) about the brand of ﬁrm E, held by buyers in markets A and
B, respectively. These perceptions inﬂuence demand in markets A and B.















In (9) and (10), βA > 0,βB ≥ 0,ρA > 0 are constants and un
A ≥ 0, un
B ≥ 0
are eﬀorts (e.g., image advertising) made by ﬁrm E to improve its goodwill
in markets A and B.
The interpretation of (9) is as follows. The brand image in market A
dilutes in proportion to the sales in market B. As customers in market A
observe an increasing number of imitations being around, their image of
the brand is negatively aﬀected. This eﬀect can be modiﬁed, however, if
the fashion ﬁrm spends image building eﬀorts (un
A > 0).
A driving force behind the demand for highly priced fashion products is
the ”snob” eﬀect (Leibenstein (1950)). This eﬀect refers to the phenomenon
that some consumers’ demand for a product decreases because others are
consuming it. In our model, the snob eﬀect is not modeled directly in the
demand function in market A, but aﬀects demand indirectly due to the
brand image dynamics in market A.
The assumption in (10) is that the sales volume in market B does not
aﬀect (negatively) market B consumers’ perception of the brand; consumers
in this market do not care about the number of products (original or fake)
being around.
If the fashion ﬁrm wishes to have a strong brand image, the dynamics
in (9) suggest that this aim can be accomplished by (i) trying to reduce
the sales of imitations and (ii) advertises to build up the brand image.
Equation (9) shows that the fashion ﬁrm’s own sales in market B are also
detrimental to brand integrity (as assessed by market A customers). Firm
E faces a dilemma here: It knows that its designs will be imitated, but
since E cannot ﬁght the imitator P in market A (where P’s product is not
sold), ﬁrm E faces its competitor in market B. This will, however, tend to
dilute the brand image in market A.





A − ρA(tn − τn)[αBMPXn
B − δpn
BMP]− (11)








B. (12)8 S. Jørgensen - A. Di Liddo
Eqs. (11) and (12) show that having a good image in market B actually
hurts the image in market A: the larger Xn
B, the smaller X
n+1
A . On the
other hand, having a good brand image in market B stimulates demand for
the product of ﬁrm E in this market - but also the demand of the imitator.
The reader should notice the implicit assumption made in (11) and (12):
XB is not aﬀected by XA. One may, more realistically, suppose that XB
is increasing with XA, which means that consumers in market B follow
consumers in market A in their regards for the fashion product. Then one
should add some increasing function of XA on the right-hand side of (12).
We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for making this observation.
However, the suggested change in the dynamics (12) makes the problem
considerably more complicated. In an analysis of the modiﬁed problem we
did not succeed in obtaining any interpretable analytical results.
2.4 Cost Functions
Before the game is played, ﬁrm E is assumed to have decided to introduce
new designs at the start of each of the two time periods. The implication is
that E’s costs of developing new designs are sunk and can be disregarded.
The variable production costs of ﬁrm E are denoted Cn
E and depend on
production (sales) volume only. Assuming a linear cost function we have
Cn
E = cE [Sn
A + Sn
BE],
in which cE is a positive constant. For simplicity it is assumed that goods
produced for markets A and B have the same unit production cost.
The production costs of ﬁrm P are denoted Cn
P. These costs depend on




in which cP is a positive constant.
Denote by Kn










in which kA and kB are positive constants. The quadratic costs reﬂect a
hypothesis that brand image building activities are subject to diminishing
marginal returns.
2.5 Proﬁt Functions
To save a bit on notation, deﬁne the constant ¯ η , (¯ p − cE)η. The proﬁt of









+ ¯ η(tn − n)Xn
A+
(pn
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and that of ﬁrm P is
πn
P = (pn









In period n, ﬁrm E has decision variables un
A,un
B,tn,pn
BE and ﬁrm P
has decision variables τn,pn
BMP,pn
BP. Decisions of the two ﬁrms are made
simultaneously and independently.
It is straightforward to demonstrate that ﬁrm P will always choose its
entry time τn as the minimal value, n+κP. The reason is that the imitator
gains nothing by postponing the introduction of its product. Hence, in what
follows we set τn = n + κP for all n.
2.6 Behavioral Assumptions
The imitator’s decisions inﬂuence the brand image XA, but the latter does
not aﬀect the payoﬀ of the imitator. For this reason the imitator can dis-
regard XA (and therefore also its dynamics). On the other hand, although
the brand image XB is payoﬀ-relevant for the imitator, the ﬁrm knows that
its decisions have no inﬂuence upon XB. Consequently, the imitator can
disregard XB (and its dynamics). The upshot is that the imitating ﬁrm
will act myopically, i.e., the ﬁrm makes its decisions on a period-by-period
basis. The reader should notice that the imitator’s myopism is a result of
the structure of the game and hence we cannot foresee what would happen
if the imitator did not behave myopically. To do so one would need a model
in which the rational behavior of the imitator would not be myopic. Then
one could suppose that the imitator was irrational and behaved myopically.
State variables XA and XB are payoﬀ-relevant to ﬁrm E, and the ﬁrm’s
decisions inﬂuence the dynamics of both variables. Thus, if it wishes, ﬁrm
E can condition its actions upon the state variables. Since the strategy of
the imitator at most will depend on time, the fashion ﬁrm can without
loss restrict itself to a strategy that depends on time only (Fudenberg and
Tirole (1992, p. 530).










where N = 2, iE ∈ (0,1] is a discount factor and σA,σB are positive
constants. The term in square brackets is a salvage value function which
assesses the value to the fashion ﬁrm of having brand images XN
A and XN
B
at the end of the planning horizon.
The imitating ﬁrm P maximizes, period-by-period, its proﬁt πn
P for n ∈
{0,1}.10 S. Jørgensen - A. Di Liddo
3 Analysis of the Game




B,ˆ tn, ˆ pn
BE
	
n∈{0,1} , {ˆ pn
BMP, ˆ pn
BP}n∈{0,1}
such that each ﬁrm’s decisions maximize its objective while taking the
decision path of the other ﬁrm as given.











































































where n ∈ {0,1} and X0
A,X0
B are given.











































































3.1 Period 1 Equilibrium Decisions


































The results in (15) say that the marginal advertising cost in period 1 equals
the (one-period) discounted value of the marginal increase in the salvage
value of the brand image5. Eﬀorts decrease if costs increase and increase if
eﬃciency β and/or the salvage value σ increase. Eﬀorts also increase if the
ﬁrm becomes more far-sighted (iE → 1). These results are as expected.












+ cEθE + iEθEρAσA

. (16)
Eqs. (14) and (16) show that the price of one product increases if the price
of the other increases. This is the standard result in a pricing game.






3γ2 + 4γ(θE + θP) + 4θEθP
{2cE(γ + θE)(γ + θP)+ (17)






3γ2 + 4γ(θE + θP) + 4θEθP
{2cP(γ + θE)(γ + θP)+




The higher the brand image X1
B at the start of period 1, the higher the
prices. The idea is that the the negative impact on demand of a high price
can be oﬀset by a strong brand image. We note that although the imitating
ﬁrm does not care about the brand image, it enjoys the beneﬁts of a strong
image.
The time to move the fashion original from market A to B is determined
by the sign of the derivative
∂ΠE


























5If there were no salvage values, ﬁrm E would have no incentive to increase the
























The result in (19) means that the fashion original should be moved from
market A to market B either as early or as late as possible. Clearly, this
result is an extreme one and excludes a ﬁne-tuning of the decision t1. It is
due to the linearity of the proﬁt function with respect to t1.
The derivative in (18) exhibits three eﬀects of an increase in t1 :
(1) ¯ ηX1











BE − ˆ p1
BP

is the loss of proﬁt












is the present value of the gain (or loss) of sal-
vage value of X2
A at the end of period 1.
For a suﬃciently large value of the brand image X1
A, the derivative in
(18) is positive and the product is never introduced on market B. This is
intuitive since when the brand has a strong image in market A it is more
proﬁtable to keep the product in this market as long as possible. On the
other hand, if the lost proﬁt in market B is suﬃciently large, the product






BMP) + (αBE + αBP)X1








is the eﬀect on the ﬁnal brand image X2
A of keeping the product on market
A for a marginally longer time. This eﬀect can be positive or negative: if
there is a suﬃciently large gain of salvage value, it pays to keep the product
in market A throughout period 1. On the other hand, if there is a large
loss of salvage value, it pays to move the product to market B as soon as
possible. If this eﬀect is positive and suﬃciently large, the product should
be on market A throughout period 1.
Remark 3.1. For another interpretation, suppose that θE = θP = 06.
Then, if αBE + αBP > αBMP, we have
−(αBMPX1
B − δp1
BMP) + (αBE + αBP)X1
B > 0,
that is, there is a gain of salvage value.
6This means that the demand functions in the duopoly period in market B depend
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3.2 Period 0 Equilibrium Decisions

































The result says that the marginal advertising cost kAˆ u0
A is the sum of the
present value of the marginal revenue obtained in market A in period 1,
iEβA(ˆ t1 − 1)¯ η, and the discounted marginal salvage value, (iE)2βAσA, of
the terminal brand image X2
A.
Sensitivity results are, by and large, the same as for ˆ u1
A, but we note the
additional term (ˆ t1 − 1)¯ η. This means that there is a positive relationship
between advertising eﬀort in market A in period 0 and the length ˆ t1 −1 of
the period during which the product is sold in market A in period 1. If the
product is sold for a longer time in market A in period 1, more advertising
eﬀort should be used in period 0. The intuition is that then it pays to build
up the brand image X1
A on which demand in period 1 will depend.
Advertising eﬀort in market B is
ˆ u0
B =













(ˆ t1 − (1 + κP))αBMP + (2 − ˆ t1)(αBE + αBP)
	
.
Using (12) and (17) shows that ˆ u0
B is linearly increasing in X0
B. What drives
this result is the fact that brand image has a positive impact on demand. A
similar result as that in (23) occurs in, e.g., Jørgensen et al. (2001) where
advertising also increases with the brand image (although at a decreasing
rate).
Remark 3.2. Note that brand image X0
B has two impacts: a high level
of X0
B provides, by the brand image dynamics in (12), a high level of X1
B,
but it also implies a high level of eﬀort u0
B (cf. (23)) which increases X1
B.















¯ η(t1 − 1) + iEσA

.14 S. Jørgensen - A. Di Liddo






3γ2 + 4γ(θE + θP) + 4θEθP
{2cE(γ + θE)(γ + θP) + cPγ(γ + θP)+
2(γ + θP)iEθEρA

¯ η(ˆ t1 − 1) + iEσA

+






3γ2 + 4γ(θE + θP) + 4θEθP
{2cP(γ + θE)(γ + θP) + cEγ(γ + θE)+
γiEθEρA

¯ η(ˆ t1 − 1) + iEσA

+




The time to move the fashion original to market B is determined by the
sign of the derivative
∂ΠE


















































As in period 1, the fashion product should be moved from market A to
market B as early or as late as possible. The derivative in (26) exhibits
four eﬀects of an increase in t0 (that is, by extending marginally the period
during which the product is kept on market A in period 0):
(1) ¯ ηX0











BE − ˆ p0
BP

is the loss of proﬁt
in market B in period 0










is the (present value of the) eﬀect on proﬁt in












is the present value of the gain (or loss) of sal-
vage value of X2
A.
Eﬀects 1, 2 and 4 have the same interpretations as in period 1. As to the
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is the eﬀect on brand image X1
A of keeping the product on market A for
a (marginally) longer time during period 0. If this eﬀect is positive and
suﬃciently large, the product should be on market A throughout period 0.
3.3 Comparing Decisions Over Time
We shall need the following
ASSUMPTION 1: θE = 0.
The assumption means that buyers of the fashion product in market B
react on price diﬀerences only (and not on the absolute price of the fashion
product).
Using (17) and (25), invoking Assumption 1, shows that
ˆ p1
BE ≥ ˆ p0
BE, ˆ p1
BP ≥ ˆ p0
BP (27)
which means that duopoly prices are nondecreasing over time. Actually, for
ˆ u0
B > 0 they increase and for ˆ u0
B = 0 they are constant over time. Thus, by
its advertising expenditure in period 0, the fashion ﬁrm can inﬂuence the
price development in the duopoly period in market B. The result is driven
by the fact that X1
B = X0
B + βBˆ u0
B and that duopoly prices in period 1
depend on X1
B.
Since the brand image XB is nonincreasing, one obtains from (13) and
(20)
ˆ p1
BMP ≥ ˆ p0
BMP.
The imitator increases its price [keeps it constant] in the monopoly period
in market B if ˆ u0
B > 0 [ˆ u0
B = 0].
To compare the fashion ﬁrm’s advertising eﬀorts over time we need
ASSUMPTION 2: iE = 1.
The assumption says that the fashion ﬁrm does not discount the future.
It is easy to see from (15) and (22) that
ˆ u0
A > ˆ u1
A
Advertising eﬀorts are decreasing over time in market A. The reason is that
advertising in period 0 has two impacts: to increase the image X1
A and to
increase the salvage value. Advertising in period 1 only aﬀects the salvage
value.































(ˆ t1 − (1 + κP))αBMP + (2 − ˆ t1)(αBE + αBP)
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Suppose that ˆ t1 = 2, i.e., the product is kept in market A throughout period
1. Then (28) yields ˆ u0
B < ˆ u1
B. Thus, advertising in market B is increased in
period 1, despite the fact that the product is kept in market A throughout
period 1. This may seem counterintuitive. What provides the result is the
positive term σAρA(2−(1+κP))αBMP which is the loss of salvage value of
X2
A caused by the imitator is having a monopoly in market B throughout
period 1.
The time to move the fashion product from market A to B are given by
the signs of the derivatives
∂ΠE























































The right-hand side of (29) shows that the derivative ∂ΠE/∂t0 depends
on the time t1 at which the product is moved from A to B in period 1.
The larger the t1, the larger the value of ∂ΠE/∂t0. This means that if the
product is moved late (or never) to market B in period 1, the likelihood
increases that the product is moved late (or never) to market B in period 0.
The signs of the derivatives in (29) and (30) provide four cases:
∂ΠE
∂t1 > 0 ∂ΠE
∂t1 < 0
∂ΠE
∂t0 > 0 (a): t0 = 1, t1 = 2 (b): t0 = 1, t1 = 1 + κE
∂ΠE
∂t0 < 0 (c): t0 = κE, t1 = 2 (d): t0 = κE, t1 = 1 + κE
In Case (a), the fashion product is never introduced on market B. In Case
(d), the product is always introduced on market B as early as possible. In
Case (b), the product is not introduced on market B in period 0, but is put
on market B as early as possible in period 1. In Case (c), the situation is
the opposite: the product is put on market B as early as possible in period
0, but is not introduced on market B in period 1.
Next, we study the derivative in (30) as a function of X1
B. For this purpose
we need





and recall that equilibrium prices p1
BE,p1
BP, and p1
BMP are functions of
X1































2γ(cE − cP) +
9γiEσAρA (αBE + αBP − 0.5αBMP)
2(2αBE + αBP)

is a constant which is positive under
ASSUMPTION 4: (i) cE > cP, (ii) αBE + αBP ≥ 0.5αBMP.
Item (i) of the assumption means that the fashion ﬁrm has the larger unit
production cost. This is very likely. Item (ii) states that the joint impact
of brand image XB on the duopoly demands is not smaller than half the
impact of the image on the imitator’s monopoly demand in market B. This
is also very likely.
Function f(X1













The sign of f(0) is not unique and there are three possibilities:
(1) f(0) > 0, f(Γ) > 0 =⇒ ∃α1 > Γ such that f(α1) = 0. We have
f(X1
B) > 0 for X1
B ∈ [0,α1), implying ˆ t1 = 2, and f(X1
B) < 0 for
X1
B > α1, implying ˆ t1 = 1 + κE. Qualitatively speaking, for X1
B suﬃ-
ciently large, it pays to move the fashion product as early as possible
to market B. The intuition is clear: The brand image X1
B has a large
value which the ﬁrm exploits by moving the product to market B as
soon as possible.
(2) f(0) < 0, f(Γ) > 0 =⇒ ∃α21 < Γ and α22 > Γ such that f(α21) =
f(α22) = 0. We have f(X1
B) < 0 for X1
B ∈ [0,α21), implying ˆ t1 = 1 +
κE, f(X1
B) > 0 for X1
B ∈ (α21,α22), implying ˆ t1 = 2, and f(X1
B) < 0
for X1
B > α22, implying ˆ t1 = 1+κE. Here it pays to move the product
to market B if the brand image X1
B has an intermediate value; if the
value is small or large, the product should remain on market A.
(3) f(0) < 0,f(Γ) < 0 =⇒ f(X1
B) < 0 for all X1
B ≥ 0, implying ˆ t1 = 1+κE
always. It pays to move the product to market B as early as possible,
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Consider (32). A key determinant of the value of f(0) is the brand image
X1
A. For a suﬃciently large value of X1
A we are in Case (1). Then, if the
brand image in market B is ”small” (i.e., below the threshold α1), the
product will not be moved to this market because it is more proﬁtable to
exploit the brand image in market A. Note that Case (1) also emerges if
cP ≈ cE.
3.4 Comparing Pricing Decisions Across Firms
The only comparison to be made is between the duopoly prices in market
B. We invoke Assumptions 1 and 4. Using (17) and (25) then yields
ˆ pi
BE > ˆ pi
BP for i ∈ {0,1},
that is, the fashion original should be higher priced than the imitation. The
result seems to conﬁrm what can be observed in real life. What drives the
result are Assumption 3 and item (ii) of Assumption 6: When the brand
image has a ”high” impact on the demand for the fashion product, and the
latter is not aﬀected by the product’s absolute price, the product can be
higher priced.
4 Conclusions
The paper has identiﬁed equilibrium strategies for price, advertising, and
entry decisions in a two-period game. A fashion company introduces new
designs regularly and competes in one market, B, with a myopic imitator
who copies the design of the fashion company. The fashion ﬁrm has a
monopoly market, A, and the imitator may have a monopoly in market B
throughout a period if the fashion ﬁrm chooses not to move its product
from market A to B. Demand in markets A and B depend on the respective
brand images. Among our ﬁndings are the following
• Equilibrium prices the duopoly period in market B are proportional
to the brand image in that market: the stronger the image, the higher
the prices
• The time of entry of the fashion ﬁrm into market B depends on the
strength of its image in markets A and B
• Image advertising eﬀorts of the fashion ﬁrm in the ﬁrst period depends
on the time it moves its product from market A to B in period 1.
Eﬀorts depends positively on the brand image in the ﬁrst period.
• Equilibrium prices in the duopoly market decrease over time
• Image advertising eﬀorts in market A are decreasing over time
• The fashion product is higher priced in market B than the imitation.Design Imitation in the Fashion Industry 19
A possible avenue for future research is to include product quality. Here
one could assume that the quality of the fashion product is ﬁxed, but the
imitator can decide which quality to manufacture. The better the quality,
the longer it will take before copy can be introduced on market B. On
the other hand, a better quality stimulates the demand for the imitation.
This problem is currently investigated by the authors. Due to the increased
complexity of the model, results are derived by numerical simulations.
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